How Turkey should respond to Israel's escalation in Syria

Last week, Israel carried out a raid targeting the runway of Syria’s Abu al-Duhur airbase, a largely inactive facility with no flights taking place. The strikes did not appear to achieve any significant military objective, beyond causing minor damage.

The significance of the Israeli attack at this particular time and place, however, stems from several intertwined factors.

The base is located in Idlib, around 70 kilometres from the Turkish border, and Israeli officials explicitly framed the attack as a message to Turkey. Ankara could easily have assumed the Israeli jets were targeting its territory, and activated defensive measures.

Israeli officials swiftly took to social media to justify the attack on security grounds.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu argued: "We will not tolerate a Turkish military entrenchment that advances southward, because it threatens us. We conveyed that message: Don’t. But apparently they didn't hear it, so we made sure they understood it better."

Likewise, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz claimed: "Erdogan is dragging Turkey into dangerous adventures in Syria. Israel will not allow any entity to threaten its security."

But even some of Israel’s closest allies were not buying this narrative, denouncing the attack as an unnecessary, reckless and dangerous escalation.

Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Turkey and special envoy to Syria, described the strikes on Abu al-Duhur airbase as an “unnecessary escalation that does not advance regional stability”.

Even one of the most staunchly pro-Israel US officials, ambassador Mike Huckabee, implied that the Israeli attack was escalating tensions and violence. He said he was working with his colleagues on a deconfliction mechanism, adding: "Nobody wants to see an escalation of the tension, an escalation of violence. So, every effort is being made to try to temper down any of the activity."

With Syria and Israel appearing on the cusp of an agreement after a year of negotiations brokered by Washington, Israel’s decision to bomb the airbase was not just a message for Turkey; it also sent a clear signal to the Trump administration. The question is: why?

Strategic calculations

Three main factors can explain the situation - two tactical, and one strategic.

On a tactical level, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is preparing for October elections, and a manufactured “imminent Turkish threat” could serve as a politically useful card.

He has been promoting an anti-Turkey narrative in Israel and the US for some time, to no avail. Adding military action to that campaign gives the alleged Turkish threat a greater sense of urgency, and could help to mobilise Israelis and consolidate his electoral base.

The fundamental problem here is that Turkey wants a strong, united, secure and prosperous Syria. This vision stands in sharp contrast to Israel’s preferred outcome: a Syria that remains weak, divided, unstable and dependent.

Ankara should be prepared for further Israeli escalation, and take steps to protect its personnel and interests, while communicating clear red lines

As Israeli analyst Danny Citrinowicz put it: “The Turks want to see a strong [President] Ahmad Al-Sharaa in Syria. Israel wants to see a weakened Ahmad al-Sharaa in Syria … Any help to strengthen Ahmed al-Sharaa in Syria will be perceived in Israel as a threat to its interests.”

On a strategic level, Erdogan has consistently outmaneuvered Netanyahu and Israeli officials at every turn.

The level of strategic challenge this represents is unusual for Israel, whose officials have historically dealt with weak, reactive, ideological or less capable opponents. Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has characterised Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as a “sophisticated and dangerous adversary” who seeks to encircle Israel.

Israeli officials were betting on provoking Sharaa into an early confrontation. They also sought to arm Kurdish groups to spread chaos in Iran, prevent Ankara from acquiring F-35s, isolate Turkey through the formation of a “hexagon alliance”, and turn US President Donald Trump against Erdogan.

Israel failed in each of these goals because of Erdogan.

Israeli officials have increasingly portrayed the Turkish president in highly hostile terms. Netanyahu’s office has labelled him an “antisemitic dictator”. Yet Turkey’s reaction to the Israeli attack on Abu al-Duhur has been measured.

Playing the long game

Ankara recently requested an international arrest warrant against Netanyahu, accusing him of genocide over Israel’s May attack on activists aboard the Global Sumud Flotilla for Gaza.

At the same time, Turkey has signalled that it is not interested in Israel’s escalation and will not fall into Netanyahu’s trap, while reaffirming its intention to continue supporting Syria.

This confrontation highlights two different strategic approaches. Israel appears to be operating through tactical calculations, with the expectation that individual actions can contribute to a broader strategic objective of maintaining instability, fragmentation, and weak states in its surrounding environment. Turkey, by contrast, appears to be playing the long game to achieve the opposite.

Although Turkish decision-makers have sought to avoid a direct confrontation with Israel, they should not rule out the possibility of further Israeli actions against Turkish interests. Israel has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to engage in radical, irrational and reckless behaviour, and to opt for high-risk and highly confrontational actions.

The fact that Israel Hayom reported that Israel had "studied" how Nato’s Article 5 works and suggested that Israel could attack Turkish troops without necessarily triggering Nato intervention means that Israel’s next step could be targeting Turkish troops, equipment, or bases outside Turkey.

A failure by Turkey to respond decisively could encourage further escalation from Israel. In this context, Turkey must remain calm, avoid being drawn into an unnecessary confrontation, and continue to think strategically, without ruling out a potential confrontation.

Ankara’s primary objective should remain the consolidation of a strong, stable, united and sovereign Syria, and the protection of its own national interests. But restraint should not be confused with passivity: Ankara should be prepared for further Israeli escalation, and take steps to protect its personnel and interests, while communicating clear red lines.

The most effective response may not be immediate military escalation, but a combination of strategic patience, deterrence, diplomacy, military preparedness, and continued engagement in Syria and the region.

The central challenge for Turkey is thus to avoid allowing Israel to dictate the terms and timing of a confrontation, while ensuring that restraint does not create the perception that further escalation will come without consequences.