Will Iran withdraw from nuclear non-proliferation treaty?

Lawmakers in Iran have once again raised the possibility of leaving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as tensions over Tehran's nuclear program and its standoff with the United States continue.

Iranian MP Ghasem Ravanbakhsh said a proposal to withdraw from the landmark treaty had been submitted and was being considered.

Ebrahim Rezaei, a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, said a withdrawal would be the "best response" to increased US economic pressure.

The idea is not new. Iranian officials and lawmakers have repeatedly raised it during periods of tension with Western governments. However, it remains unclear whether Tehran is actually preparing to leave the treaty or whether the threat itself is the objective.

What would leaving the nuclear treaty mean?

In 1970, Iran ratified the agreement, which is the main international treaty on nuclear non-proliferation.

The NPT has 191 member states and is based on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, promoting peaceful nuclear cooperation and pursuing nuclear disarmament.

Any member can withdraw if it believes that extraordinary events related to the treaty have put its supreme national interests at risk.

It must give three months' notice to the other members and the UN Security Council and explain its reasons. Leaving the treaty is therefore legally possible.

Behrooz Bayat, a nuclear expert and former consultant to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), told DW that the process would take time.

"A withdrawal would almost certainly be seen internationally as a signal that Iran intends either to keep open the option of developing nuclear weapons or to move toward doing so," Bayat said.

He said such a perception could sharply increase political and economic pressure and potentially raise the risk of further military action.

For that reason, Bayat believes Tehran's repeated threats are more useful as diplomatic leverage than as a policy it actually intends to pursue.

Why withdrawal may not benefit Tehran

Shahin Modarres, an international security analyst and researcher at LUISS University in Rome, told DW that the renewed debate should be seen in the context of stalled negotiations over uranium enrichment and Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium.

Iran has about 440 kilograms (972 pounds) of uranium that is enriched up to 60% purity, a short, technical step from weapons-grade levels of 90%, according to the IAEA.

Inspectors from the UN's nuclear watchdog were unable to verify the location of much of the material after the June 2025 US and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

Iran has already sharply reduced international oversight. In July 2025, Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian signed legislation to suspend access for IAEA inspectors into the country until the "security" of its nuclear facilities is guaranteed.

That created what Modarres describes as a potentially more useful position for Tehran than formally withdrawing from the treaty.

"Withdrawal would remove that ambiguity without offering any clear advantage, turning a dispute over compliance into an explicit declaration of intent," the analyst said.

"By remaining formally within the NPT while limiting inspections, Iran can maintain uncertainty about its capabilities and intentions without openly leaving the global non-proliferation system," he added. "Withdrawing would remove much of that uncertainty."

A countdown could increase military risk

Withdrawal could also have security implications for Tehran. Under Article X of the treaty, states must give three months' notice before withdrawing. That period would give Israel, the United States and other governments time to reassess Iran's intentions.

Some analysts argue that governments already concerned about Iran's stockpile of 60%-enriched uranium could interpret a withdrawal as a sign that Tehran was moving closer to a nuclear weapons capability.

Bayat said that makes actual withdrawal considerably less attractive than threatening to do so. He added that leaving the treaty could also "complicate Iran's civilian nuclear cooperation."

Membership in the treaty "provides the broader legal and political framework through which non-nuclear states gain access to peaceful nuclear technology," he said. "Russia remains involved in Iran's civilian nuclear sector, particularly at the Bushehr nuclear power plant."

"Formally withdrawing from the treaty could make future cooperation much more difficult politically and legally, even though existing agreements would need to be assessed separately," added Bayat.

Opposition inside Iran

There is no clear consensus in Iran. Rahman Ghahremanpour, a Tehran-based analyst who has written extensively about Iran's nuclear program, told DW that withdrawing from the treaty has been discussed repeatedly but has never become government policy.

"The issue of leaving the NPT is not new and has been raised many times before," he said. "But right now, there are significant legal and political obstacles, and there is still no full consensus within Iran."

Ghahremanpour said the international community would closely examine any attempt to invoke Article X. He points to the ongoing legal debate over North Korea's withdrawal as an example.

North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. Although Pyongyang is generally treated internationally as no longer being a party to the treaty, some UN documents note that its formal status remains uncertain.

The treaty itself, however, does not require UN Security Council approval for withdrawal. It requires only that states notify the council.

For Ghahremanpour, the political message is more important than the legal process.

He believes talk of leaving the NPT is mainly aimed at pressuring Washington, and particularly European governments, to make concessions.

Edited by: Keith Walker