Has the UAE's meteoric rise reached its limit?

Few major issues in the Middle East unfold today without the UAE playing a role.

From backing Egypt’s 2013 military coup, to intervening in Yemen, to supporting renegade general Khalifa Haftar in Libya and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, the Emiratis have built a network of influence across the Horn of Africa, while investing strategically in ports, energy, technology and defence.

In less than two decades, Abu Dhabi has transformed itself from a relatively low-profile Gulf state into one of the region’s most assertive powers. How did a country of around one million citizens acquire such an outsized regional role?

The UAE’s rise is linked to its ability to capitalise on successive regional crises, beginning with the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, accelerating with the Arab Spring, and gaining strength amid Washington’s declining engagement in the Middle East.

Together, these developments created a power vacuum that Abu Dhabi filled through a combination of military capabilities, financial resources, security networks and international alliances. But the geopolitical conditions that enabled this rise are now changing, raising questions about whether the UAE’s strategy can endure.

After Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, the UAE emerged as a new federation facing significant domestic and external challenges. It had to build federal institutions, integrate the armed forces of seven emirates, and establish a permanent constitutional order, while navigating relations with two powerful neighbours, Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Iran had already seized Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa just before the federation’s creation, while Saudi Arabia did not formally recognise the UAE until 1974, after Abu Dhabi ceded disputed border territory.

Post-9/11 transformation

For the country’s first two decades, the Emirati leadership focused on consolidating the new state. It adopted a cautious foreign policy, playing a limited role in regional affairs.

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 marked a turning point, demonstrating that wealth alone could not guarantee security. The crisis coincided with the growing influence of Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, a Sandhurst graduate and air force commander who sought to strengthen the country’s military while cultivating strategic partnerships with major powers, enabling the UAE to reduce its dependence on Saudi Arabia.

Between 1991 and 1996, Abu Dhabi purchased advanced weapons worth around $66bn and signed defence agreements with the US, France and the UK. Its armed forces grew to around 65,000 personnel, but this military buildup remained largely defensive in nature.

The real transformation in the UAE’s political doctrine came only with the series of geopolitical shocks that unfolded at the start of the 21st century.

The UAE expanded its influence by operating largely in fragile states, while avoiding direct confrontations with stronger regional powers. But that model is becoming harder to sustain

The involvement of two Emirati nationals in the 9/11 attacks reinforced concerns within the country’s leadership about Islamist movements and how they could affect relations with Washington. The 2004 death of the UAE’s founder, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, simultaneously cleared the way for a new generation of leaders headed by Mohammed bin Zayed, who embraced a more assertive foreign policy centred on military and security instruments.

The oil boom of 2003-08 generated unprecedented financial surpluses that bolstered defence industries and sovereign wealth funds, providing the economic foundation for a more ambitious regional role. But the decisive shift came with the Arab Spring.

Abu Dhabi viewed the collapse of several Arab regimes, and the electoral rise of Islamist parties, as a fundamental threat to regional stability. Domestically, a petition calling for political reforms – signed by 132 Emirati intellectuals and activists, including members of al-Islah – reinforced the leadership’s belief that political Islam represented the greatest challenge to domestic stability.

Shortly after Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak resigned as president, Mohammed bin Zayed ordered the creation of the UAE Presidential Guard.

Around the same time, the Obama administration’s policies – including its abandonment of Mubarak, and the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran – deepened Emirati doubts about the reliability of the US security umbrella. Abu Dhabi responded by adopting a more proactive regional strategy, joining Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen in 2015.

Expanding influence

Four developments thus converged: the weakening of several Arab states, fears of political Islam, uncertainty over long-term US commitments, and the availability of substantial financial and military resources. Together, they produced a new Emirati regional doctrine based on a belief that national security begins beyond the country’s borders.

The UAE also found common ground with Israel. Shared concerns over Iran, Islamist movements and the decline of US engagement culminated in the Abraham Accords in 2020.

Abu Dhabi subsequently built its regional strategy around supporting local partners aligned with its interests. It backed Egypt’s military against former President Mohamed Morsi, supported Haftar in Libya, partnered with Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council, and cultivated ties with paramilitary leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) in Sudan.

The UAE also developed relations with Somaliland and Somali federal member states independently of the government in Mogadishu. Fragmented political landscapes have often enhanced Emirati influence by allowing it to cultivate multiple local actors.

The UAE expanded its influence by operating largely in fragile states, while avoiding direct confrontations with stronger regional powers. But that model is becoming harder to sustain.

Tensions with Saudi Arabia contributed to the UAE’s withdrawal from Yemen, while the ongoing confrontation with Iran threatens the foundations of the Emirati economy, undermining its image as a secure hub for investment, tourism and logistics. Managing such risks requires Abu Dhabi to prioritise protecting its own territory over projecting power abroad.

The return to power of Islamists in countries such as Syria and Afghanistan has likewise demonstrated the deep political roots of these movements. Rather than seeking simply to isolate them, the UAE has increasingly adopted a pragmatic policy of engagement with new rulers.

Ultimately, the principal constraint on the Emirati model is structural. The UAE possesses immense financial resources and an extensive network of international partnerships, but it remains a small state with a limited citizen population and little strategic depth – making it difficult to sustain prolonged regional crises, or to confront larger powers directly.