A Pact Without Impact

A Pact Without Impact

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Argument:

A Pact Without Impact

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Argument

An expert’s point of view on a current event.

A Pact Without Impact

The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement faces all the classic challenges of an alliance with none of the unifying elements.

By **Vasabjit Banerjee**, an associate professor of political science at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville.

!Red, white, and green fireworks burst against a dark sky as midrise buildings loom nearby. The fireworks and lights on the building illuminate wafts of pale smoke from earlier firework explosions.

*Red, white, and green fireworks burst against a dark sky as midrise buildings loom nearby. The fireworks and lights on the building illuminate wafts of pale smoke from earlier firework explosions.*

Fireworks explode as part of celebrations to mark the signing of a trilateral defense agreement between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey, seen in Islamabad on Aug. 9. Aamir Qureshi / AFP via Getty Images

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August 25, 2026, 9:14 AM

The Mecca pact signed on Aug. 7 between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey has variously been described as a “Muslim,” “Islamic,” “Sunni,” or “Middle Eastern” NATO. Some of these epithets might simply reflect commentators’ limited repertoire of alliance metaphors. But Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan explicitly referenced NATO in describing the new pact’s defense provisions.

Indeed, the pact declares mutual defense as a duty of its three members—an attack on one will be considered an attack on all. But it does not establish a central command system, any paths to achieve greater interoperability, or clear obligations in terms of defense spending and procurement. It also does not mention the use of nuclear weapons.

The Mecca pact signed on Aug. 7 between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey has variously been described as a “Muslim,” “Islamic,” “Sunni,” or “Middle Eastern” NATO. Some of these epithets might simply reflect commentators’ limited repertoire of alliance metaphors. But Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan explicitly referenced NATO in describing the new pact’s defense provisions.

Indeed, the pact declares mutual defense as a duty of its three members—an attack on one will be considered an attack on all. But it does not establish a central command system, any paths to achieve greater interoperability, or clear obligations in terms of defense spending and procurement. It also does not mention the use of nuclear weapons.

This is not to say that the alliance is meaningless. The Mecca pact builds on years of bilateral defense cooperation between the countries involved. This includes Pakistan and Saudi Arabia’s defense cooperation, which began in the mid-1960s and has involved Pakistan training personnel and deploying troops in Saudi Arabia. This has provided critical help for the wealthy but insecure Saudi regime, which cannot risk a too powerful and autonomous military.

Pakistan and Turkey have also enjoyed deepening defense cooperation ties centered on weapons systems supplied by Turkey, which include four co-produced MILGEM corvette ships and 30 T129 ATAK helicopters. Pakistan may act as a conduit for transferring cutting-edge weapons developed by China, such as the co-produced JF-17 aircraft, to Turkey as well.

However, bilateral ties in themselves do not make for a strong alliance. Theorists of international relations identify four problems that weaken all alliances: chain-ganging, buck-passing, moral hazard, and free-riding. The Mecca pact is prone to all four types of these problems, but at present does not address any of them.

First, alliances are prone to chain-ganging, wherein one member drags in the other members of an alliance to a conflict that is inimical to their national interests. One should recall how Russia’s promises to Serbia led to its allies France and Britain entering the First World War to respect their treaty obligations.

In this case, Pakistan could try to make Turkey and Saudi Arabia parties to Pakistan’s long-running militarized rivalry with India. Saudi Arabia and India maintain cordial relations: India imports nearly $22 billion annually of crude oil, natural gas, and petroleum by-products from Saudi Arabia, and their total trade exceeded $40 billion in 2024. Turkey might also seek to pull Pakistan and Saudi Arabia into its deepening rivalry with Israel over Syria. Indeed, this particular risk is exacerbated by the ambiguity over who, if anyone, the Mecca pact is intended to defend against. Already, commentators have alternately described it as focused on Israel and focused on Iran.

Second, alliances can be prone to buck-passing, wherein members refuse to honor their alliance commitments, especially when one member is threatened by a nonmember. Alliance members pass the buck because the threats posed are not severe enough for them to enter wars or because the costs of a war are unacceptable to them. The partial and then complete annexation of Czechoslovakia by Germany in 1938 was not prevented by France, which deemed it a minor issue, nor by Yugoslavia and Romania—with which Czechoslovakia had an alliance—because it appeared too costly.

A similar situation could arise if Iran attacked Saudi Arabia: Turkey and Pakistan would find that the costs of intervening outweigh any benefits. Iranian threats to Turkey consist mainly of severely weakened Iranian proxies in Lebanon and Syria, while Pakistan shares a border with Iran along its volatile Balochistan province, where Iranian support for armed Baloch proxies could be dangerous.

Additionally, all three countries have domestic political equilibriums centered on th